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HEIDI KITROSSER
THE SPECIAL VALUE OF PUBLIC
EMPLOYEE SPEECH
In its 2014 decision in Lane v Franks,1 the Supreme Court held that
a public employee deserved protection, under the First Amend-
ment, for testifying under oath about financial fraud in the statewide
youth program he directed. The Court rejected the lower court’s
view that, because the testimony consisted of information that Lane
had learned in the course of performing his job, his employer should
be free to sanction him for his speech.2 The lower court’s approach,
the Supreme Court explained, is in tension with one of the core
reasons that it accords public employees some First Amendment pro-
tection. That is, “speech by public employees on subjectmatter related
to their employment holds special value precisely because those em-
ployees gain knowledge of matters of public concern through their
employment.”3
Lane’s internal logic is eminently sound. If public employee speech
is protected partly because employees gain unique insights on the job,
it makes little sense to exclude from protection all speech reflecting
Heidi Kitrosser is Professor, University of Minnesota Law School.
Author’s note: I am very grateful to Cindy Estlund, Pauline Kim, Helen Norton, Mary-
Rose Papandrea, Geof Stone, and participants at the 2015 Freedom of Expression Scholars
Conference at Yale Law School for wonderfully helpful comments.
1 Lane v Franks, 134 S Ct 2369 (2014).
2 Lane v Central Alabama Community College, 523 Fed Appx 709, 711–12 (11th Cir 2013).
3 Lane, 134 S Ct at 2379 (2014).
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those insights. This reasoning inspires both a hope and a lament
about the Court’s 2006 decision in Garcetti v Ceballos.4 The lament is
that Garcetti’s rule—that speech conducted pursuant to one’s public
employment is unprotected—itself is at odds with the notion that
public employee speech has special value because of the distinctive
insights and expertise it offers. The Garcetti rule also reflects an
overly generous vision of the government interests at stake. The hope
is that Lane provides occasion to dig more deeply into both the spe-
cial value of public employee speech and the government interests
at issue and thus to rethink Garcetti entirely. More modestly, Lane
can point the way to means by which Garcetti can be limited.
In this article, I explore the yin and yang of Lane, both the la-
ment and the hope. In lamentation mode, I argue that Garcetti is
emblematic of the Court’s failure to dig beneath the surface of its own
long-standing acknowledgment that public employee speech holds
special value. If one tunnels into that subterrane, one finds that the
value of public employee speech is a function not just of content, but
of form. Public employees play a special role under the First Amend-
ment by virtue of their privileged access both to information and
to communication channels for conveying it. The special communi-
cation channels to which employees have access—including internal
channels—can be uniquely effective in supporting accountability and
the rule of law, and thus in fulfilling core free speech values.
Public employees’ special communication channels take two forms.
The first encompasses avenues to raise grievances, such as when
agencies provide employees with special complaint procedures or
privileged access to inspectors general. The second is more subtle,
encompassing the simple acts of employees doing their jobs con-
scientiously and in accordance with the norms of their professions.
When employees engage in such behavior—for instance, when gov-
ernment auditors honestly and competently investigate and report
in a manner consistent with professional auditing standards—they
help to maintain consistency between the functions government pur-
ports to perform and those that it actually performs. In this sense,
public employees are potential barriers against government decep-
tion. They can disrupt government efforts to have it both ways by
purporting publicly to provide a service while distorting the na-
4 Garcetti v Ceballos, 547 US 410 (2006).
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ture of that service.When they do this through their speech acts—for
example, by reporting the results of budgetary analyses or scientific
studies—they engage in speech of substantial First Amendment
value.
Apart from its cramped and under-theorized conception of spe-
cial value, Garcetti also betrays confusion over the government in-
terests at stake. Garcetti suggests both that public employers require
managerial discretion to evaluate work product that takes the form
of speech and that because public employees speak for the gov-
ernment their supervisors can dictate their speech content. Al-
though the former is a legitimate concern, the latter is wildly over-
broad. It applies legitimately to only a narrow subset of government
jobs. The latter also reflects a profoundly underdeveloped concep-
tion of special value, as special value derives partly from employees
making independent professional judgments. Indeed, a government
speech rationale would swallow even a shallow vision of special
value, overtaking employees’ rights to disseminate any speech that
supervisors deem unwelcome.
In my more hopeful mode, I consider how a fuller conception
of special value might be reconciled with a more sharply defined
government interest. I propose that, where work product speech
can confidently be identified, courts should consider whether em-
ployees were disciplined based on a genuine, not pretextual assess-
ment of work product quality. Only disciplinary actions based on
such assessments should be exempt from further scrutiny. Crucially,
in cases where employees were hired to render independent pro-
fessional judgments, disappointment with those judgments, not be-
cause they reflect low quality, but because they are politically or
personally inconvenient for employers, should not be deemed quality-
based assessments. As a second-best, but perhaps more realistic near-
term alternative, I also consider means to limit Garcetti’s reach.
In Part I, I unpack the Supreme Court’s understanding of pub-
lic employee speech value as reflected in the so-called “Pickering”
cases,5 which include Garcetti and Lane. In Part II, I turn to lower
federal courts, summarizing lower court approaches, both before and
after Lane, to the difficult, case-by-case determination that Garcetti
requires them to make: when is speech engaged in pursuant to one’s
5 The cases are so named for the first in the series, Pickering v Board of Education, 391 US
563 (1968).
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job and thus unprotected by the First Amendment? In Part III, I
develop the concept of the special value of public employee speech,
exploring its underpinnings in free speech theory and constitutional
structure. In Part IV, I examine Garcetti’s major defenses and chal-
lenge the argument that Garcetti does not much impact free speech
values because it mostly affects internal government speech. In
Part V, I expand on what constitutes a judgment based on work prod-
uct quality and on how courts can determine whether discipline was
based on a genuine such judgment. Finally, in Part VI, I consider a
moremoderate, and perhapsmore realistic, approach. That approach
builds on Lane in order to narrow Garcetti’s reach.
I. Unpacking the Supreme Court’s Understanding(s) of Public
Employee Speech Value
This part summarizes the modern constitutional doctrine of
public employee speech, with an emphasis on the Court’s stated un-
derstandings of the free speech interests at stake. As I will show, one
of the Court’s two major rationales for protecting public employee
speech—the goal of achieving parity between the free speech pro-
tections enjoyed by government employees and those enjoyed by oth-
ers—does little explanatory work on its own. The Court is much more
convincing insofar as it suggests that public employee speech war-
rants protection because it holds special social value. But the Court’s
failure to probe very deeply into the nature of this special value, and
its tendency to vacillate between the parity and special value ra-
tionales, stunts the special value rationale’s contributions to the doc-
trine. I also explain that an additional rationale for protecting public
employee speech—one based on fears of government-imposed or-
thodoxy—can be found in the loyalty oath and antisubversion cases
that are the modern doctrine’s most immediate ancestors. This third
rationale does little work in the decisions that comprise the modern
doctrine, but if resurrected it could contribute to a richer and more
coherent approach.
a. the modern approach to public employee speech:
an overview
The Court’s 1968 decision in Pickering v Board of Education was
the first in the line of cases comprising the modern doctrine of pub-
lic employee free speech rights. In Pickering, the Court established
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both that public employees have some protection from being ter-
minated or disciplined for their speech, and that the government has
broader discretion to punish speech when it operates as an employer
thanwhen it acts as sovereign.6 The governmentmay constitutionally
punish its employees for their speech when justified by the “interests
of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees.”7 The Court explained
that courts must weigh any such interests, case by case, against the
interests of employees, as “citizen[s], in commenting upon matters of
public concern.”8 In Connick v Myers, the Court clarified that em-
ployee speech is subject to protection under this standard (hereafter
the Connick-Pickering test) only when it involves a matter of public
concern.9 In Garcetti, the Court added that speech is unprotected,
even if it involves a matter of public concern, when it is part of the
employee’s job.10
Pickering and its progeny offer two main justifications for protect-
ing employee speech. The first justification, aptly termed the “parity
theory” by Randy Kozel,11 is that government employees should not
be robbed of “the First Amendment rights that they would other-
wise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest.”12
The goal of parity is not definitively linked to a single conception of
free speech value. In describing it, theCourt evokes both free speech’s
intrinsic value to the speaker and its social value.13 The parity ap-
proach seems grounded in the notion that whatever values are served
by free speech presumptively apply to government employees just
6 Pickering, 391 US at 568.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Connick v Myers, 461 US 138, 142–43, 146–47 (1983). The Court later suggested that
public employees who speak or write on their own time about matters unrelated to their
jobs—whether or not those matters are of public concern—warrant protection stronger
than that accorded public employees who speak on or about their jobs. See Cynthia
Estlund, Harmonizing Work and Citizenship: A Due Process Solution to a First Amendment
Problem, 2006 Supreme Court Review 115, 128–29, 131–32 (2006) (citing United States v
National Treasury Employees Union, 513 US 454 (1995), City of San Diego v Roe, 543 US 77
(2004)).
10 Garcetti, 547 US at 421.
11 Randy J. Kozel, Free Speech and Parity: A Theory of Public Employee Rights, 53 Wm &Mary
L Rev 1985, 1990 (2012).
12 Pickering, 391 US at 568.
13 See id at 568, 571–72. See also, for example, Roe, 543 US at 82–83.
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as they do to others. Deviations from ordinary free speech protec-
tions thus are warranted only when justified by the state’s needs as
employer.14
The second justification, which I call the “special value” rationale,
is linked to speech’s extrinsic value to the public. From this per-
spective, public employees deserve free speech protections not be-
cause they are just like everybody else, but because they have some-
thing special to contribute to the marketplace of ideas. As the Court
has observed, public employees “are often the members of the com-
munity who are likely to have informed opinions as to the operations
of their public employers, operations which are of substantial con-
cern to the public.”15 This justification, too, must give way when
warranted by overriding employer needs.
b. a closer look at the parity rationale
1. Parity as independent justification. Perhaps the most foundational
criticism that can be directed toward the parity rationale is that it
compares metaphorical apples and oranges. The approach’s premise
is that public employees should not be robbed of “the First Amend-
ment rights that they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment
on matters of public interest.”16 But when government fires or
disciplines its own employees, it exercises a power that by definition it
could not exercise over persons not in its employ.17
14 See Pickering, 391 US at 568 (citing need to balance employee’s interest “in commenting
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs”). See also Kozel, 53 Wm & Mary L Rev at
2011 (cited in note 11) (deeming “default of parity” the most logical implication of the
Court’s rejection of the rights-privilege distinction and explaining that under “[p]arity
theory . . . the doctrine of employee speech should be reoriented around a single inquiry: Is
there a valid reason for permitting the government to treat the employee differently from
her peers in the citizenry at large?”).
15 Roe, 543 US at 82.
16 Pickering, 391 US at 568. See also, for example, Connick, 461 US at 142 (“state cannot
condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally
protected interest in freedom of expression”).
17 See Kermit Roosevelt III, Not as Bad as You Think: Why Garcetti v. Ceballos Makes Sense,
14 U Pa J Const L 631, 637 (2012) (“Government employees cannot be fined or thrown in
jail for speech any more than a private citizen”); Patrick M. Garry, The Constitutional Relevance
of the Employer-Sovereign Relationship: Examining the Due Process Rights of Government Em-
ployees in Light of the Public Employee Speech Doctrine, 81 St John’s L Rev 797, 798 (2007)
(suggesting Supreme Court erred in equating “[G]overnment as employer” with “govern-
ment as sovereign”).
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If parity between likes were the Court’s concern, it might make
more sense for it to compare public employers with private em-
ployers, rather than to compare government qua sovereign with gov-
ernment qua employer. This would return us to the approach that
the Court took prior to the mid-twentieth century, when it drew a
distinction between rights (such as free speech) and privileges (such
as holding a job).18 As JusticeHolmes famously explained while sitting
on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, “The petitioner
may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no consti-
tutional right to be a policeman.”19 Holmes’s rights/privilege distinc-
tion seems grounded in a baseline norm of parity between private and
public employers. As a government employee, one enters into an
employer-employee relationship, just as one would do in a private
enterprise. That the employer happens to be the government ought
not to affect its discretion to supervise its employees. Only when the
government operates as a sovereign—imposing civil or criminal pen-
alties—does the Constitution restrain it.
The modern Court does not explain why, insofar as parity is its
concern, it shifts from comparing public and private employers to
comparing government qua sovereign with government qua em-
ployer.20 Perhaps the answer inheres, simply enough, in the state ac-
tion doctrine. After all, the First Amendment applies only to the
government, not to private actors. Still, if the state action doctrine
explains why public employers are constrained by the First Amend-
ment, it does not guide us as to the type and degree of such constraints.
In this respect, parity may be viewed simply as a logical starting point.
The notion that the free speech rights enjoyed by nonemployees
should be the starting point, or default norm, for public employees’
First Amendment rights seems closest to what the Supreme Court
has actually said about parity. Yet the doctrine that the Court con-
structs—that is, the Connick-Pickering balance and its caveats—bears
18 See Estlund, 2006 Supreme Court Review at 147–48 (cited in note 9) (“To anchor the
free speech rights of public employees to those of private sector employees vis-à-vis their
employers would . . . take us back to the heyday of the ‘rights-privileges’ distinction.”).
19 McAuliffe v City of New Bedford, 155 Mass 216, 220 (1892).
20 Kermit Roosevelt observes that the modern Court to some extent is motivated by both
types of parity. See Roosevelt, 14 U Pa J Const L at 633 (cited in note 17) (“First, the Court
wants to promote equality between government and private employers with respect to
control over the workplace and employee performance. . . . Second, it wants to maintain
equality between government employees and other citizens.”).
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little resemblance to the doctrine that applies when government
restricts speech in its sovereign capacity. Recall, for example, that
public employee speech is unprotected when it is not about a matter
of public concern.21 A categorical pass for government employers to
punish speech not of public concern could not be further removed
from the doctrine that restricts government’s power to punish speech
when it acts as sovereign. And the Connick-Pickering balance itself,
with its deferential approach even to restrictions based on content,
marks a far cry from the protections accorded persons when the
government acts as sovereign. The concept of parity thus seems to
do very little work beyond contributing to the view that public em-
ployee speech warrants some First Amendment protection.22
2. Social value as a supplement to parity. While the concept of par-
ity in its own right contributes little to the public employee speech
doctrine, other factors have greater explanatory value. The most ob-
vious is government’s interest in protecting its managerial control
over employees. As for speech value, the factor that looms largest in
the Court’s reasoning is the social value of public employee speech.
The Court cites social value as among the reasons why it protects
public employee speech. Of more practical consequence, it has con-
cluded that only speech on matters of public concern is sufficiently
valuable to displace employers’managerial discretion. Parity interests
therefore are triggered only when public employees speak on mat-
ters of public concern. In Connick v Myers, in which the Court first
declared that speech on “matters of personal interest” would not be
protected “absent the most unusual circumstances,”23 the Court ob-
served that it “has frequently reaffirmed that speech on public issues
occupies the ‘highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment
values,’ and is entitled to special protection.”24
21 Employees retain some protection for conveying speech away from and unrelated to
their job. See note 9.
22 See Kozel, 53 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1989–90, 2013–22 (cited in note 11) (deeming
parity rationale incompatible with modern public employee speech doctrine, describing
what parity-based doctrine would look like). See also Estlund, 2006 S Ct Rev at 149 (cited
in note 9) (“When we scratch the surface of the [Garcetti] majority’s recurring references to
the ‘liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen,’ they appear to be less
an aid to analysis than a rhetorical trope.”).
23 Connick, 461 US at 147.
24 Id at 145.
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The Court in Connick did hedge its bets a bit, citing the height-
ened value of public affairs speech while also conflating private in-
terest speech with speech “made as an employee,” such as “employee
grievances,” for which there are no nonemployee analogues.25 In
this way, the Court hinted at two separate justifications for limit-
ing protection to public interest speech: the greater social worth of
such speech and the goal of parity in its own right. Subsequent cases
made clear, however, that private interest speech is not limited to em-
ployee grievances.26 This development, combined with the Court’s
invoking the heightened value of public affairs speech in Connick and
elsewhere, suggests that the Court excludes private interest speech
mainly because it is insufficiently valuable to offset employers’ man-
agerial control. The Court made this point explicit in City of San
Diego v Roe:
To require Pickering balancing in every case where speech by a public
employee is at issue, no matter the content of the speech, could compro-
mise the proper functioning of government offices. . . . This concern
prompted the Court in Connick to explain a threshold inquiry . . . that in
order to merit Pickering balancing, a public employee’s speech must touch
on a matter of “public concern.”27
c. the special value rationale
Beyond the parity rationale, the Court has recognized that public
employees can add something special to the marketplace of ideas—
something that other individuals cannot contribute—when they speak
about their jobs. As the Court explained in San Diego v Roe, “[u]n-
derlying the decision in Pickering is the recognition that public em-
ployees are often the members of the community who are likely
to have informed opinions as to the operations of their public em-
ployers, operations which are of substantial concern to the public.”28
This reasoning is prominent in several opinions in the Pickering line of
cases, including Pickering,Garcetti, and Lane. The Court in these cases
25 Id at 147.
26 See, for example, Roe, 543 US at 78–79, 84 (deeming sexually explicit videos featuring
uniformed police officer not of public concern); id at 83–84 (“public concern is something
that is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value
and concern to the public at the time of publication”).
27 Id at 82–83.
28 Id at 82.
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has invoked this concept, in addition to parity, to explain why public
employee speech warrants some protection.29
To be sure, it was not until Lane that the Court coined the term
“special value” to capture this rationale.30 Nor has the Court cited the
special value rationale consistently.31 Moreover, there are two sig-
nificant shortcomings in the Court’s discussion of special value, and
both affect the contours of the doctrine. First, the Court’s under-
standing of special value is incomplete. Second, the Court mixes its
special value and parity discussions somewhat haphazardly, at times
interjecting parity in a way that stunts the scope of the protections
that might otherwise follow from special value.
As for the Court’s incomplete understanding, although it recog-
nizes the potentially high value of public employee speech content,
it overlooks the value of employees’ access to privileged channels
through which to communicate that content. As the Court has rec-
ognized in the Pickering cases and elsewhere, the First Amendment
serves partly to support self-government and the rule of law. It serves,
in short, to support the constitutional structure. That structure de-
pends on a variety of internal as well as external checks.32 The special
access that public employees have to a mix of channels, including
internal channels, to convey dissenting views is as important to the
constitutional design as the content of those views. It was the Court’s
failure to credit this aspect of special value that enabled it to deny
protection to work product speech in Garcetti.33
29 See Pickering, 391 US at 572 (“Teachers are, as a class, the members of a community
most likely to have informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to the operations
of the schools should be spent. Accordingly, it is essential that they be able to speak out freely
on such questions”); Waters v Churchill, 511 US 661, 674 (1994) (plurality opinion) (“Gov-
ernment employees are often in the best position to know what ails the agencies for which
they work”); Roe, 543 US at 82 (language quoted at text accompanying note 28); Garcetti,
547 US at 419–21 (citing with approval Pickering and Roe discussions of special value); Lane,
134 S Ct at 2379 (“speech by public employees on subject matter related to their employment
holds special value precisely because those employees gain knowledge of matters of public
concern through their employment”).
30 Lane, 134 S Ct at 2379.
31 For example, the Court does not mention the rationale in Connick, despite the fact that
the speech the Court deemed “of public concern” there involved the speaker’s workplace. See
Connick, 461 US at 149.
32 See Part III(B) (explaining that federal executive branch is designed partly to facilitate in-
ternal checking).
33 For instance, the Garcetti Court minimized Garcetti’s impact by observing that employees
still can participate in “civic discourse” like other citizens. Garcetti, 547 US at 422–24.
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The Court also wields the concept of parity in a way that stunts
the reach of special value-based protections. It did this most notably
in Garcetti. There, it based its decision to preclude protection for
all work product speech partly on the fact that “such speech owes
its existence to a public employee’s official responsibilities.” Sup-
pressing it therefore “does not infringe any liberties the employee
might have enjoyed as a private citizen.”34 While the Court else-
where in Garcetti cited the special social value of public employee
speech, it shifted its focus to parity just long enough to dismiss con-
stitutional concerns over categorically denying protection to work
product speech.
The parity-based aspect of Garcetti’s reasoning is in tension with
the very notion of special value,35 and it generated the uncertainty
that led to Lane v Franks. Some lower courts, relying on Garcetti’s
statement that speech is unprotected when it “owes its existence” to
the speaker’s public employment, leaned heavily against protect-
ing speech consisting of information learned through such employ-
ment.36 The Fourth Circuit took this view in Lane,37 leading to its
reversal by the Supreme Court.38
In Lane, the Supreme Court mitigated some of the damage caused
by its incomplete conception of special value and its haphazard mix-
ing of the special value and parity rationales. It did not, however, fully
reverse that damage or eliminate the tension between Garcetti and
the special value rationale. Indeed, Lane is potentially subject to a
narrow reading, one that limits it to settings in which speech consists
of “truthful subpoenaed testimony” that is not part of the speaker’s
ordinary job duties.39 Under this reading, Lane would not necessarily
34 Garcetti, 547 US at 421–22. See also Estlund, 2006 Supreme Court Review at 144–45
(cited in note 9) (citing “recurring motif in the Garcetti majority opinion: the effort to anchor
the free speech rights of public employees to the ‘liberties the employee might have enjoyed
as a private citizen,’” and explaining motif ’s restrictive effects).
35 See Estlund, 2006 Supreme Court Review at 119–20 (cited in note 9) (noting tension
between parity and special value rationales).
36 See Part II(A)(1).
37 See note 56 (discussing Eleventh Circuit opinions in Lane).
38 See text accompanying notes 2–3.
39 The Lane majority notes that it granted certiorari to “resolve discord among the Courts
of Appeals as to whether public employees may be fired—or suffer other adverse employment
consequences—for providing truthful subpoenaed testimony outside the course of their or-
dinary job responsibilities.” Lane, 134 S Ct at 2377.
8] PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH 311
This content downloaded from 131.212.251.007 on October 02, 2017 08:08:15 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
preclude courts in other settings from weighing the fact that speech
conveys information learned on the job heavily or even conclusively
against First Amendment protection. To be sure, this would be a
flawed interpretation of Lane. Although the Court in Lane deemed
special value particularly evident in the factual setting before it, it
invoked the concept more broadly.40 It also cited earlier decisions
embracing the special value rationale outside of the testimonial con-
text.41Moreover, for reasons that I discuss later, a generous reading of
Lane is most consistent with free speech theory. Nonetheless, Lane is
open to a narrow interpretation that would sharply limit its signifi-
cance in protecting speech of special value, and even a broad reading
of Lane cannot fully erase the damage done by Garcetti.
d. government distrust
For better orworse, then, themodern public employee speech cases
frame the free speech interests at stake predominantly in terms of
(under-theorized) parity and special value rationales. A third ratio-
nale—one arising out of government’s natural inclination to quell
criticism about itself—can be gleaned from a string of earlier deci-
sions. These ancestors to Pickering arose “from the widespread efforts
in the 1950s and early 1960s to require public employees, particularly
teachers, to swear oaths of loyalty to the state and reveal the groups
with which they associated.”42 In several of these decisions, the Court
characterized loyalty requirements as dangerous attempts by gov-
ernment to leverage its role as employer to enforce orthodoxy in its
institutions and throughout American society.
The Court’s opinion in Wieman v Updegraff reflects this view.
Writing for the Court in 1952, Justice Clark cited the inevitable
chilling effect of a state law conditioning public employment on an
oath of nonaffiliation with subversive groups.43 “There can be no dis-
pute,” he explained, “about the consequences visited upon a per-
son excluded from public employment on disloyalty grounds. In the
view of the community, the stain is a deep one; indeed, it has become a
40 Id at 2377, 2379.
41 Id.
42 Connick, 461 US at 144 (calling these cases “the precedents in which Pickering is rooted.”).
43 Wieman v Updegraff, 344 US 183, 184–86 (1952) (describing state law).
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badge of infamy.”44 The oath requirement “stifle[s] the flow of
democratic expression and controversy at one of its chief sources.”45
The Court suggested that the stakes were especially high where
employment in public schools was at issue. In Keyishian v Board of
Regents—a case decided just one year prior to Pickering, and cited
in Pickering and throughout its progeny—“the Court invalidated
New York statutes barring employment [in the New York State
public school system] on the basis of membership in ‘subversive’ or-
ganizations.”46 Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court invoked “ac-
ademic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not
merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special
concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that
cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.”47
Wieman itself was brought by faculty and staff members of Okla-
homa Agricultural andMechanical College.48 Concurring inWieman,
Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Douglas, observed that “the case
of teachers brings the safeguards of [the First Amendment] vividly
into operation. . . .”49 Inhibitions such as loyalty and oath require-
ments have “an unmistakable tendency to chill that free play of spirit
which all teachers ought especially to cultivate and practice.”50
Pickering’s most direct ancestors were thus rooted partly in fears
that government will leverage its power as an employer to enforce a
culture of political orthodoxy. In these decisions, the Court reasoned
that employees might censor themselves to avoid retaliation from
employers, and that restrictions on public employee speech could
threaten the operation of government institutions that depend on
open lines of inquiry and discourse.
These concerns provide another set of explanations for important
aspects of Pickering and its progeny. First, they enhance the case for
protecting public employee speech, supplementing the special value
rationale with the concern that, left to its own devices, government
will leverage its role as employer to skew public knowledge and
44 Id at 190–91.
45 Id at 191.
46 Connick, 461 US at 144 (citing Keyishian v Board of Regents, 385 US 589, 605–06 (1967)).
47 Keyishian, 385 US at 603.
48 Wieman, 344 US at 184–85.
49 Id at 195 (Frankfurter, J, concurring).
50 Id at 195.
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debate. Second, they suggest a further reason for the Court to focus
on speech about public affairs. That is, government officials will be
most tempted to manipulate knowledge and criticism about them-
selves rather than about purely privatematters. Third, these concerns
help make sense of the Court’s acknowledgment in Garcetti that
“[t]here is some argument that expression related to academic schol-
arship or classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional
interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court’s customary
employee-speech jurisprudence,” and its consequent caveat that it is
not deciding “whether the analysis . . . [inGarcetti] would apply in the
same manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship or
teaching.”51
The Court has not explicitly incorporated a government distrust
rationale into its modern public employee speech doctrine, but it
should. Such reasoning would improve the doctrine’s coherence and
content. For instance,Garcetti’s reference to academic freedom could
be buttressed by analysis echoing that of the loyalty oath and anti-
subversion cases. The Court might also connect the dots between the
academic freedom arguments of the earlier cases and broader “anti-
distortion” fears to the effect that government might leverage its em-
ployment relationships to manipulate the messages produced by its
institutions. Indeed, the Court has hinted at an antidistortion ratio-
nale in First Amendment cases involving government subsidy con-
ditions.52
In Parts III through VI, I will elaborate on how government dis-
trust and the related antidistortion interest should factor into the
doctrine and theory of public employee speech rights. Specifically,
I will explain how a richer conception of special value might incor-
porate such concerns and help improve the doctrine. For the mo-
ment, though, suffice it to note that the rudiments of such reasoning
can be found in the loyalty oath and antisubversion precedents that
are the Pickering cases’ most direct antecedents.
II. Lower Court Decisions Since Garcetti and Lane
In this Part I explore some of the approaches taken by lower
courts in their efforts to determine when public employee speech
51 Garcetti, 547 US at 425.
52 See discussion at Part III(A)(2).
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can be restricted after Garcetti. Some approaches reflect and even
exacerbate Garcetti’s pathologies, while others mitigate them. Simi-
larly, in the year since the decision in Lane, some lower courts have
invoked Lane to narrowGarcetti’s reach, while others have essentially
ignored it.53
a. the content of the speech
1. Does the information relate to, or was it learned through, the speaker’s
job? Prior to Lane, some courts and commentators adopted strong,
even conclusive presumptions to the effect that speech is unprotected
under Garcetti when it conveys information learned on the job.54
Support for this view derived most directly from Garcetti’s parity-
driven statement that “[r]estricting speech that owes its existence to
a public employee’s professional responsibilities does not infringe
any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen.”55
In the wake of Garcetti, some lower courts reasoned that speech re-
lating to, or conveying information learned through, an individual’s
public employment would not have existed absent the employment.
They weighed this factor heavily against protection.56 Other courts
53 Lane was issued on June 19, 2014. Using Westlaw, I researched opinions decided be-
tween that date and June 26, 2015. I used the search term (garcetti /2 ceballos) to search the
entire text of opinions for all state and federal cases issued within the designated time frame.
Given the number of cases that turned up (over 260), I looked only at federal appellate court
cases. Some of the cases that I reviewed relied on pre-Lane developments in their juris-
dictions. Where useful, I followed those leads and thus read and report here on some pre-
Lane cases as well as post-Lane cases. I also conducted separate searches to find pre-Lane
opinions on certain discrete issues, including the status of speech conveying information
learned on the job.
54 See cases cited at note 56. See also Stephen I. Vladeck, The Espionage Act and National
Security Whistleblowing After Garcetti, 57 Am U L Rev 1531, 1540–41 (2008) (suggesting
Garcetti precludes protection for speech conveying information learned through speaker’s
public employment); Garry, 81 St John’s L Rev at 814 (cited in note 17) (same).
55 Garcetti, 547 US at 421–22.
56 See, for example, Lane v Central Alabama Community College, 523 Fed Appx 709, 712
(11th Cir 2013) (relying solely on fact that Lane’s testimony was about acts performed in his
official capacity, although stating that that fact was “not dispositive” of conclusion that the
testimony was unprotected); Abdur-Rahman v Walker, 567 F3d 1278, 1279, 1283 (11th Cir
2009) (deeming reports unprotected because they concerned information learned through
investigations performed “as part of [plaintiffs’] assigned duties”); id at 1289 (Barkett dis-
senting) (“the essence of the majority opinion, with its emphasis on Garcetti’s phrase ‘owes its
existence to,’ appears to be that speech about anything a public employee learns about in the
course of performing his job . . . is unprotected, because the speech would not exist without
the job activity”). See also, for example, Gorum v Sessoms, 561 F3d 179, 185 (3d Cir 2009)
(“We have held . . . that a claimant’s speech might be considered part of his official duties if it
relates to ‘special knowledge’ or ‘experience’ acquired through his job.”). But see Dougherty v
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implicitly rejected this reasoning by protecting speech relating to, or
conveying information learned through, a speaker’s public employ-
ment.57 Still others explicitly rejected this reasoning, deeming it at
odds with reasoning in the Pickering cases, including Garcetti, re-
garding the special value of public employee speech.58
In Lane, the SupremeCourt made clear that, at a minimum, speech
is not unprotected merely because it conveys information learned on
the job, or otherwise relates to one’s public employment, when it
consists of truthful subpoenaed testimony outside of one’s ordinary
job responsibilities.59 More broadly, the Court in Lane observed that
“the mere fact that a citizen’s speech concerns information acquired
by virtue of his public employment does not transform that speech
into employee—rather than citizen—speech.”60
Since Lane, federal courts of appeal have continued to ask whether
speech relates to the speaker’s employment or concerns information
learned in the course of the employment. Although they usually in-
dicate that these factors are not dispositive, they differ appreciably
in the weight they accord the factors. The most straightforward way
for courts to limit the weight of these factors is to consider them
only insofar as they shed light on the ultimate question articulated in
Lane—that is, whether an employee spoke within “the scope of his
ordinary job responsibilities.”61 The United States Courts of Appeals
for the Third and Fifth Circuits both described their inquiries, post-
Lane, as so circumscribed.62 On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit
57 See Heidi Kitrosser, Free Speech Aboard the Leaky Ship of State: Calibrating First Amend-
ment Protections for Leakers of Classified Information, 6 J Natl Sec Law & Policy 409, 436 nn
135–36 (2013) (citing post-Garcetti cases protecting speech conveying information learned on
the job).
58 See Chrzanowski v Bianchi, 725 F3d 734, 738 (7th Cir 2013); Carl v City of Mountlake
Terrace, 678 F3d 1062, 1071–72 (9th Cir 2012).
59 See note 39 and accompanying text.
60 Lane, 134 S Ct at 2379.
61 Id at 2378.
62 See Culbertson v Lykos, 790 F3d 608, 618 (5th Cir 2015) (“First Amendment . . . may still
apply when the employees make statements relating to their public employment; the question
‘is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties, not
whether it merely concerns those duties’ ”); Flora v Luzerne, 776 F3d 169, 178 (3d Cir 2015)
(“whether an employee’s speech ‘concern[s] the subject matter of [his] employment’ is
‘nondispositive’ under Garcetti. . . . In Lane, the Supreme Court clarified that “ ‘[t]he critical
School District of Philadelphia, 772 F3d 979, 989 (3d Cir 2014) (clarifying, post-Lane, that
Gorum does not stand for proposition that the special knowledge factor alone makes speech
unprotected).
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described the “central inquiry” as “whether the speech at issue ‘owes
its existence’ to the employee’s professional responsibilities.” The
Eleventh Circuit did not deem it “dispositive” that “the speech con-
cerns the subject matter of the employee’s job,” although it allowed
that that “may be relevant.”63
It also is worth noting that, in a post-Lane unpublished opinion, the
Fifth Circuit appeared to place substantial emphasis on whether in-
formation was learned in the course of the speaker’s job, and neither
cites Lane nor otherwise makes clear that the factor is not disposi-
tive.64 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has issued a post-Lane unpub-
lished opinion that does not cite Lane, and that gravitates between
asking whether speech was made “pursuant to” an employee’s duties
or whether it simply “related to” or “owed its existence to” those
duties.65
2. Is the speech directed toward resolving problems that interfere with
the employee’s duties? Both before and after Lane, a number of lower
courts deemed the fact that speech is directed toward resolving
problems that interfere with the speaker’s duties to signal its status
as work product speech. In Weintraub v Board of Education, for ex-
ample, the Second Circuit held, in a pre-Lane case, that a teacher’s
union grievance “challeng[ing] the school assistant principal’s deci-
sion not to discipline a student who had thrown books” at the teacher
was unprotected under Garcetti.66 The court cited Weintraub’s ar-
gument that inaction posed a threat to himself, to other teachers,
to students, and to the school’s learning environment.67 The court
deemed the grievance “‘pursuant to’ [Weintraub’s] official duties
because it was ‘part-and-parcel of his concerns’ about his ability to
‘properly execute his duties’ . . . as a public school teacher—namely,
63 Moss v City of Pembroke Pines, 782 F3d 613, 618 (11th Cir 2015).
64 Tucker v Parish, 582 Fed Appx 363, 365–66 (5th Cir 2014) (“even assuming his duties as a
probation officer did not include reporting misconduct that occurred in his presence,
Tucker’s speech consisted of reporting information he gained because of his employment as a
probation officer”).
65 Smith v North Star Charter School, Inc., 593 Fed Appx 743, 744–45 (9th Cir 2015).
66 Weintraub v Board of Education, 593 F3d 196, 198 (2nd Cir 2010).
67 Id at 199, 203.
question under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an
employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties’”); Dougherty v School District
of Philadelphia, 772 F3d 979, 989 (3d Cir 2014) (rejecting notion that speech is unprotected
because it relates to one’s job or conveys information learned through it, explaining that prior
case considered such factors but treated them as nondispositive).
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to maintain classroom discipline, which is an indispensable prereq-
uisite to effective teaching and classroom learning.”68 The court cited
opinions from several circuits using similar reasoning.69
In a post-Lane case, the Eleventh Circuit similarly took the view
that an assistant fire chief engaged in Garcetti speech, largely be-
cause his comments were directed toward resolving problems that
fell within his job responsibilities. The court found that the assistant
chief ’s duties “encompassed every aspect of running the fire depart-
ment,” including budgetary matters.70 The court also cited his testi-
mony to the effect that his criticisms of the city on budget and pen-
sion matters—criticisms made in a pension board meeting, a staff
meeting, and conversations with fire department employees—were
“motivated by his belief that the City’s actions would negatively im-
pact the fire department’s provision of services.” This testimony, the
court explained, “confirms that plaintiff ’s speech was made in fur-
therance of his self-described responsibilities.”71 The court was un-
moved by the fact that he “was not required to provide the requested
guidance” and that he had, in fact, “been instructed to keep his opin-
ions [on these matters] to himself.”72
Lower court decisions also identify factors that may indicate that
speech was not directed toward resolving problems within a speaker’s
job responsibilities. For example, the more narrowly that an em-
ployee’s job duties are defined, the more difficult it is to character-
ize speech as supporting them. To illustrate, the Second Circuit in
Matthews v City of New York recently distinguished Weintraub and
found that a police officer did not speak as an employee when he
complained to his commanding officers about the precinct’s arrest
quota policy.73 The court explained that the officer’s “speech ad-
dressed a precinct-wide policy. Such policy-oriented speech was
neither part of his job description nor part of the practical reality of
his everyday work.”74
68 Id at 203.
69 Id at 202–03.
70 Pembroke Pines, 782 F3d at 618–19.
71 Id at 619.
72 Id at 620.
73 Matthews v City of New York, 779 F3d 167, 169, 174 (2d Cir 2015).
74 Id at 174.
318 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW [2015
This content downloaded from 131.212.251.007 on October 02, 2017 08:08:15 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Some of the Supreme Court’s language in Lane—particularly its
casting of the Garcetti inquiry as whether the employee spoke within
“the scope of his ordinary job responsibilities”75—strengthened the
case for defining speech that furthers one’s job responsibilities nar-
rowly. Indeed, while the court inMatthews—which was decided post-
Lane—did not invoke Lane in this manner, its emphasis on whether
speech addresses impediments to one’s “day-to-day responsibilities”
is consistent with such reasoning.76 Other courts have expressly
“speculated whether” Lane’s use of a “new adjective, [‘ordinary’] sig-
nals a shift in the law that broadens the scope of First Amendment
protection for public employees.”77 For example, the D.C. Circuit in
Mpoy v Rhee, while not deciding the question, acknowledged that
this aspect of Lane might require the court to narrow its “consis-
tent[]” holding that “a public employee speaks without First Amend-
ment protection when he reports conduct that interferes with his
job responsibilities, even if the report is made outside his chain of
command.”78
3. Does the speech convey information about government misconduct?
Another factor is whether speech conveys information about gov-
ernment misconduct. Both prior to and since Lane, the Fourth Cir-
cuit has invoked broad language suggesting that speech exposing
public corruption warrants protection. In its 2015 decision inHunter
v Mocksville, the Fourth Circuit reiterated its statement from an
earlier case that “‘speech about serious governmental misconduct,
and certainly not least of all serious misconduct in a law enforce-
ment agency, is protected.’”79 The court observed that the Supreme
Court in Lane made statements in keeping with this view.80 The
Court in Lane had indeed explained that “[i]t would be antithetical
75 See Lane, 134 S Ct at 2378.
76 The Matthews court does cite Lane in passing in two places. Matthews, 779 F3d at 172,
175.
77 Flora, 776 F3d at 179, n 11 (3rd Cir 2015) (citing Mpoy v Rhee, 758 F3d 285, 295 (DC
Cir 2014)). See also Gibson v Kilpatrick, 773 F3d 661, 668 (5th Cir 2014) (“much of the
treatment of Lane thus far has speculated that the insertion of ‘ordinary’ may signal a
narrowing of the Supreme Court’s position on Garcetti’s coverage”).
78 Mpoy at 291, 294–95. The court refrained from deciding whether the D.C. Circuit must
indeed adjust its past holdings in light of Lane. It found that, at minimum, the defendant had
qualified immunity because she could reasonably have believed prior to Lane that the
plaintiff ’s speech was unprotected. Id at 295.
79 Hunter v Mocksville, 789 F3d 389, 401 (4th Cir 2015).
80 Id at 398.
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to our jurisprudence to conclude that the very kind of speech nec-
essary to prosecute corruption by public officials—speech by public
employees regarding information learned through their employ-
ment—may never form the basis for a First Amendment retaliation
claim.”81
While the Fourth Circuit’s expansive language could be inter-
preted to mean that speech exposing public corruption or abuse of
authority intrinsically constitutes citizen speech, the Fifth Circuit in
Gibson v Kilpatrick cautioned against reading Lane so broadly. It ar-
gued that “the passage [in Lane] must be read in the context of Lane’s
facts and in light of Lane’s statement that the opinion does ‘not ad-
dress in this case whether truthful sworn testimony would constitute
citizen speech under Garcetti when given as part of a public em-
ployee’s ordinary job duties.’”82 The court in Gibson only decided,
however, that so expansive a reading of employee protections was
not “clearly established”with respect to conduct that took place prior
to Lane.83
b. how or to whom was the speech conveyed?
Lower courts have also considered, both before and since Lane,
whether the audience to whom the speech was conveyed, or the me-
dium through which the speech was conveyed, reflects the speaker’s
employment. A common way for courts to couch this inquiry is to
ask whether the employee directed her speech “up the chain of
command.”84 Others frame the inquiry by asking whether there is a
81 Lane, 134 S Ct at 2380.
82 Gibson, 773 F3d at 669.
83 Id. See also id at 666 (explaining inquiry’s significance: defendants possess qualified
immunity for behavior infringing on rights not clearly established at the time of that be-
havior).
84 See, for example, Wilson v Tregre, 787 F3d 322, 325 (5th Cir 2015) (“Wilson was acting
in his official duties . . . . he was simply reporting potential criminal activity up the chain of
command”); Flora, 776 F3d at 177 (citing 2007 case in which Third Circuit “declined to
extend First Amendment protection when the speech in question was directed ‘up the chain
of command’”); Olendzki v Rossi, 765 F3d 742, 749 (7th Cir 2014) (quoting 2010 Seventh
Circuit case to effect that “a public employee’s complaints ‘made directly up the chain of
command to his supervisors are not protected under the First Amendment’”); Mpoy, 758 F3d
at 294 (DC Cir 2014) (“whether speech is made inside or outside a chain of command may be
a contextual factor in determining whether the employee made it to report interference with
his job responsibilities”); Wetherbe v Smith, 593 Fed Appx 323, 328 (5th Cir 2014) (quoting
2008 Fifth Circuit case for proposition that an employee “generally does not have First
Amendment protection for communications that ‘relate to his own job function up the chain
of command’”).
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“civilian analogue” for the speaker’s chosen medium or the speech
recipient.85
Of course, what constitutes “the chain of command” or what pos-
sesses a “civilian analogue” can be defined broadly or narrowly, with
significant consequences for the scope of speech protection. For
example, the Fifth Circuit in Gibson v Kilpatrick took an expansive
view of the “chain of the command”—or, more precisely, of its
equivalent—in reasoning that a city’s mayor (Kilpatrick) did not
infringe the city police chief ’s (Gibson’s) clearly established First
Amendment rights. Gibson alleged that Mayor Kilpatrick had re-
taliated against him for reporting Kilpatrick’s misuse of a city gas card
to outside law enforcement agencies, including the FBI, the federal
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the state attorney general, and
the Office of the State Auditor (OSA).86 The court acknowledged
that among the factors it typically considers in determining whether
a speaker spoke as an employee “is whether the employee’s com-
plaint was made within the chain of command or to an outside actor,
such as a different government agency or the media.”87 The court
clarified, however, that reports to outsiders are not invariably citizen
speech. It concluded that Gibson conveyed his reports to external
agencies as an employee. The court relied partly on the fact that
chain-of-command reporting would not have been a desirable op-
tion for Gibson. It explained:
the only entities to which [Gibson] could have reported within the chain
of command were [Mayor] Kilpatrick and the Board. Reporting to Kil-
patrick—the suspected perpetrator—clearly was undesirable, while report-
ing to the Board might have required public disclosure of Gibson’s sus-
picions, perhaps endangering the subsequent investigation. Indeed, it appears
that once Board members learned of the investigation, one of them in-
formed Kilpatrick.88
In Gibson, the Fifth Circuit thus defined the chain-of-command
factor broadly enough to encompass reporting either through an
employee’s actual chain of command or through logical alternatives.
85 Matthews, 779 F3d at 173, 175–76.
86 Gibson, 773 F3d at 664–65.
87 Id at 670.
88 Id at 671. See also id at 670 (“where, as here, the employee is reporting the misconduct
of his supervisor, an outside agency may be the most appropriate entity to which to report the
misconduct”).
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The court also considered whether Lane should affect its reasoning.89
While acknowledging that a few “aspects of the Lane opinion . . .
appear to offer the prospect of new law,”90 the court concluded that
such aspects, at minimum, were not “‘clearly established’ at the time
of the challenged conduct,” which took place prior to Lane.91 Lane
thus did not affect the Fifth Circuit’s finding that the defendants
violated no clearly established rights and therefore had qualified
immunity.92
In contrast to the Fifth Circuit in Gibson, the Second Circuit in
Matthews recently rejected a very expansive take on the conditions
under which a speaker’s forum choice signaled that he spoke as an
employee. The Second Circuit held that police officer Craig Mat-
thews spoke as a citizen when he complained to his commanding
officers about an arrest quota policy at his precinct.93 Among the
factors the court considered was whether the forum through which
Matthews spoke had “a civilian analogue.”94 The Second Circuit
found that Matthews “chose a path that was available to ordinary
citizens who are regularly provided the opportunity to raise issues
with the Precinct commanders.”95 It rejected the district court’s
reasoning that Matthews’s speech lacked a civilian analogue because
“Matthews had better access to his commanding officers than would
ordinary citizens.”96 “Presumably,” the Second Circuit explained, “em-
ployees always have better access to senior supervisors within their
place of employment.”97 If an employee’s relative “degree of access”
were considered, “internal public employee speech on matters of
public concern not made as part of regular job duties would be un-
likely to receive First Amendment protection.”98
89 The Fifth Circuit had issued an initial decision in Gibson prior to Lane. The Supreme
Court vacated and remanded after Lane. Id at 666.
90 Gibson, 773 F3d at 668.
91 Id at 669. See also id at 670.
92 Id at 670–73.
93 Matthews, 779 F3d at 169.
94 Id at 173.
95 Id at 176.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
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Sounding a note similar to that of the Second Circuit, the Fourth
Circuit recently emphasized that speakers can be protected for
speech directed through internal as well as external channels.99 The
court cited Lane’s trumpeting of the special value of public employee
speech and its warning against reading Garcetti too broadly.100 The
Fourth Circuit also cited Justice Stevens’s concern, expressed in
dissent in Garcetti, “that it would be ‘perverse to fashion a new rule
that provides employees with an incentive to voice their concerns
publicly,’” rather than internally.101
III. The Special Value of Public Employee Speech
In this part, I develop the concept of the special value of public
employee speech. The basic argument is that public employees have
a crucial structural role to play in countering government’s capacity
for deception. As courts acknowledge, one aspect of special value
consists of the unique insights that public employees gain through
their work. But courts disregard two other facets of special value.
First, to the extent that employees have special access to internal
communication channels, this heightens their free speech value. Sec-
ond, through the very act of doing their jobs conscientiously and in
accordance with the norms of their professions, public employees help
to maintain consistency between the functions in which government
purports to engage and those that it actually performs. In this sense,
public employees are potential barriers against government deception
through distortion.
The remainder of Part III expands on these points by building
their theoretical foundations. Subpart A sets forth the free speech
theory based foundations and identifies judicial precedent consis-
tent with the same. Subpart B draws support from constitutional
structure, particularly the federal separation of powers.
a. insights from free speech theory
1. Self-government, checking, and distrust. The First Amendment’s
text simply does not, either on its face or through its original mean-
99 Hunter, 789 F3d at 399, 402.
100 Id at 396–97.
101 Id at 402.
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ing, tell us very much about its scope.102 As a result, scholars and
courts long have relied on theories about the values underlying the
Free Speech Clause to help determine the scope of First Amend-
ment protections.103
The case for protecting public employees’ work product speech
builds on several strands of free speech theory. At its most basic level,
it starts with the notion that, whatever other purpose the Free Speech
Clause serves, it undoubtedly protects the conveyance of informa-
tion and opinion about government to support an informed and en-
gaged citizenry. This point is of no real controversy.104 It is closely
tied to the notion that speech that facilitates oversight and checking
of government has substantial value.105 A corollary of both notions is
that wariness is called for whenever government seeks to restrict
speech about its own operations.106
Vigilance against government efforts to skew public knowledge
and debate in its favor is central to the Supreme Court’s understand-
ing of the First Amendment. As already noted, in its Cold War era
loyalty oath and antisubversion decisions the Court railed against
government’s leveraging its role as employer to enforce political or-
thodoxy in the workplace or the broader community.107 Similar ju-
dicial concerns are evident in the “content distinction” rule, which
creates a strong presumption against laws or law enforcement based
on the viewpoint, subject matter, or communicative impact of
speech.108 The Court even has limited government’s ability to pun-
ish content-based subcategories of otherwise unprotected speech, for
102 I have elaborated on this point elsewhere. See Heidi Kitrosser, Interpretive Modesty, 104
Georgetown L J ∗nn 168–72, 183–85 and accompanying text (forthcoming, 2016) (on file
with author); Kitrosser, 6 J Natl Sec L & Policy at 421–22 (cited in note 57).
103 See note 102.
104 Kitrosser, 6 J Natl Sec L & Policy at 422 n 63 (cited in note 57) (citing consensus that
“whatever else the freedom of speech may encompass, it undoubtedly includes a right to
convey information and opinion about government”).
105 The seminal work on the checking value in First Amendment theory is Vincent Blasi’s
article of that title. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 2 Am
Bar Found Res J 521 (1977). Blasi details the checking value and explores its relationship to
other free speech values. Id at 548, 553–554, 557–65.
106 Frederick Schauer demonstrated that all major free speech theories share a core distrust
of government, and that this should be a central concern of free speech doctrine. Frederick
Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry 33–34, 44–46, 86, 162–63 (Cambridge, 1982).
107 See discussion at Part (I)(D).
108 See, for example, Heidi Kitrosser, From Marshall McLuhan to Anthropomorphic Cows:
Communicative Matter and the First Amendment, 96 Nw U L Rev 1339, 1339–1342, 1345–49
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fear that government will use unprotected speech categories as ve-
hicles to discriminate based on “hostility—or favoritism—towards the
underlying message expressed.”109
2. Distortion. Self-government, checking, and distrust theories
lend themselves to concerns that government will distort informa-
tion no less than that it will suppress it. By “information distortion,” I
refer to the phenomenon whereby government purports to provide
or subsidize information of a type that is defined by reference to
professional or social norms, while manipulating the information in
a manner antithetical to those norms. Distortion occurs, for exam-
ple, where government hires climate scientists to make climate pro-
jections but insists that they alter their findings for political reasons as
a condition of their continued employment. Distortion alters the very
picture of reality against which the public or intragovernmental ac-
tors can assess and respond to government actions and decisions.110
This concern about distortion is linked to another concern: that
courts tend to overstate the dichotomy between “government speech”
and “citizen speech.”111 The government is free, of course, to express
its own viewpoints, including through government employees and
subsidy recipients. Few would argue, for example, that “[w]hen
Congress established a National Endowment for Democracy to en-
courage other countries to adopt democratic principles . . . it was . . .
constitutionally required to fund a program to encourage compet-
ing lines of political philosophy such as communism and fascism.”112
But not all government speech consists of policy messages that the
109 R.A.V. v St. Paul, 505 US 377, 386 (1992).
110 See, for example, Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s
Control of Its Workers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 Duke L J 1, 27–31 (2009)
(explaining that free speech concerns are raised when government’s role in crafting speech of
employees or subsidy recipients is obscured); Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When
Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83 NYU L Rev 605, 665–71 (2008) (making similar
point); Randall P. Bezanson and William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86
Iowa L Rev 1377, 1397–1401, 1450, 1460–61, 1487, 1491 (2001) (same).
111 See text accompanying notes 114–16. See also, for example, Corbin, 83 NYU L Rev at
625–26 (cited in note 110) (suggesting that public employee speech typically mixes “citizen
speech” and “government speech”); Estlund, 2006 Supreme Court Review at 151–53 (cited in
note 9) (“The work [public] employees do for the public through their job may be a truer . . .
expression of their character and self-conception as citizens than their rare letters to the
editor or statements at public meetings.”).
112 Rust v Sullivan, 500 US 173, 194 (1991).
(2002) (summarizing the rule and citing cases, though noting that Supreme Court does not
always treat communicative manner as content).
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government transparently acknowledges as such. In many cases the
government purports to subsidize speakers—whether by employing
them or by funding particular projects—precisely for the expertise
that enables them to make sound independent judgments.
Accordingly, some scholars observe that when government hires
certain types of employees—for instance, lawyers or scientists—or
subsidizes particular types of speech—such as artwork or health-
care guidance—it commissions work constrained by professional,
artistic, ethical, or other norms. Courts artificially wipe away these
aspects of expertise and judgment—these “private citizen” aspects,
so to speak—when they treat the speech as government property
subject to government’s unfettered control. In so doing, courts con-
flate speech that purports to deliver professional expertise with speech
that transparently conveys the government’s policy preferences. By
placing both in the “government speech” category, the Court enables
the government to claim that it has commissioned “professional”
speech at the same time as it strips that speech of the very features that
make it professional.
For example, Robert Post criticizes the Supreme Court’s reason-
ing in the 1991 case of Rust v Sullivan. In Rust, the Court upheld
federal regulations barring family planning clinics from mention-
ing abortion in the course of providing federally subsidized counsel-
ing.113 Post questions whether the Court erred by treating subsidized
medical counseling as falling within the government’s “managerial
domain,” subject to extensive government control. Post notes that
“[p]hysicians are of course professionals, and . . . professionals must
always qualify their loyalty and commitment to the vertical hierarchy
of an organization by their horizontal commitment to general pro-
fessional norms and standards.”114
Orly Lobel expresses similar concerns, using insights from orga-
nization theory. Lobel invokes the concept of “enlightened loyalty,”
whereby a loyal employee exercises some independent judgment,
rather than blind obedience, to further the good of their organiza-
tion.115 From this perspective, the Court in Garcetti misstepped by
113 Id at 173, 191.
114 Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 Yale L J 151, 172 (1996). See also id at 170–76.
115 Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping Obliga-
tions, 97 Cal L Rev 433, 437–40, 477 (2009).
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drawing too sharp a distinction between one’s wisdom, judgment,
and moral and legal commitments as a private citizen, and one’s acts
as a public employee.116
The Supreme Court expressly invoked antidistortion reasoning
in the 2001 case of Legal Services Corporation v Velazquez. Velazquez
involved a federal statutory restriction on the use of Legal Ser-
vices Corporation (LSC) funds. LSC was established by Congress
in 1974 “to distribute funds appropriated byCongress to eligible local
grantee organizations ‘for the purpose of providing financial sup-
port for legal assistance in noncriminal proceedings or matters to
persons financially unable to afford legal assistance.’”117 The restric-
tion prohibited attorneys, in the course of LSC-funded represen-
tation, from challenging the constitutionality of state or federal wel-
fare laws or the consistency of statewelfare lawswith federal statutes.118
While LSC attorneys were free to argue that agents had interpreted
or applied welfare statutes incorrectly in their clients’ cases, they were
forbidden from challenging the legality of the statutes themselves.119
The United States argued that the restriction did not abridge
speech, but simply set the parameters of a program that Congress had
created and funded. The Court rejected this position. It explained
that “[w]here the government uses or attempts to regulate a particular
medium, we have been informed by its accepted usage in determin-
ing whether a particular restriction on speech is necessary for the
program’s purposes and limitations.”120 The LSCprogram purported
to use the legal system “to facilitate suits for benefits.”121 Yet the
restriction distorted that system by interfering with the “traditional
role” of attorneys, limiting the range of “arguments and analyses”
that they may make to courts and the options that they may present
116 Id at 433–34, 453–55.
117 Legal Services Corporation v Velazquez, 531 US 533, 536 (2001).
118 Id at 536–37.
119 LSC interpreted the restriction to mean that “[e]ven in cases where constitutional or
statutory challenges became apparent after representation was well under way . . . its attorneys
must withdraw.” Id at 539.
120 Id at 543. To support this point, the Court cited limited public forum cases invalidating
restrictions that altered the nature of the forums at issue. It acknowledged that the forum
cases, while instructive, “may not be controlling in a strict sense” since Velazquez “involves a
subsidy.” Id at 544.
121 Velazquez, 531 US at 544.
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to clients.122 The Court cited the negative effects of this distortion
on the separation of powers, particularly on the judiciary.123
The Supreme Court had hinted at similar antidistortion concerns
in the Cold War era loyalty oath and antisubversion cases. As ex-
pressed by the majority in Keyishian, the fear was that the restric-
tions would distort the classroom’s status as “peculiarly the ‘mar-
ketplace of ideas.’”124 Or, as Justice Frankfurter put it, concurring
inWieman, such restrictions might “chill that free play of spirit which
all teachers ought especially to cultivate and practice.”125
Of course, neither the antisubversion cases nor Velazquez consti-
tute the Supreme Court’s only wisdom regarding public employee
speech or government-funded speech. Garcetti and Rust complicate
the case law, and they have kindred precedent. Indeed, Rust was the
first in a line of cases taking an expansive view of the government’s
power to control “government speech.” These cases involved speech
that was created at least partly by private actors and that was not
transparently presented as having been shaped by the government.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court characterized the speech as the
government’s own and permitted the government to control its
content, free from the constraints of the First Amendment.126 While
Velazquez and the antisubversion cases thus are hardly the Supreme
Court’s only word on the matter, they do reveal flashes of judicial
insight consistent with a more robust conception of the special value
of public employee speech. These shards of wisdom, combined with
those in the academic literature, provide the foundation for a free
speech theory that offers a more satisfying approach to public em-
ployee speech.
122 Id.
123 Id at 546.
124 Keyishian, 385 US at 603.
125 See note 50.
126 See, for example, Walker v Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S Ct 2239 (2015) (holding
that state engaged in speech when it issued specialty license plates designed by private groups
and that state therefore could reject proposed designs without any First Amendment limits);
Pleasant Grove City, Utah v Summum, 555 US 460 (2009) (holding that city engaged in speech
by accepting privately donated monuments for a public park and that city therefore could re-
ject donations without First Amendment constraint). See also, for example, Corbin, 83 NYU
L Rev at 611–16, 639–40, 663–71 (cited in note 110) (discussing government speech doc-
trine and arguing that it takes an overly broad view of what constitutes government speech);
Norton, 59 Duke L J at 25–32 (cited in note 110) (same).
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b. a role for constitutional structure
The First Amendment is not the only constitutional means to
check government power.127 The Constitution is filled with mecha-
nisms that enable government actors and institutions to challenge
one another. Most important for our purposes are those checks on
presidential power that empower subordinates to dissent.
Elsewhere, I have discussed such checkingmechanisms in depth.128
I summarize them here, starting with those that draw directly on
constitutional text.129 A number of textual details—including but
not limited to the division of the appointments power between the
President and the Senate, Congress’s constitutional ability to dele-
gate some inferior officer appointments away from the President,
and the Opinions Clause, which confirms that the President may
require written opinions from executive department heads—suggest
an executive branch in which the President has substantial but not
unfettered supervisory authority and in which his subordinates are
potential checks against abuse or incompetence.130
The textual indications are bolstered by history from the fram-
ing and ratification period. For example, supporters of the proposed
Constitution insisted that the Framers, in declining to annex a council
to the President, had intentionally deprived the President of a group
that would do his bidding and hide his secrets. Alexander Hamilton
argued that the President not only would lack a council behind which
to hide, but that his appointed subordinates, who were subject to
Senate approval, would be unlikely to shield his bad acts.131
These structural aspects of the Constitution and its history con-
firm the dual role of public employees in the federal system. On the
one hand, government employees are a part of the executive branch
and are charged with supporting its efficacy. On the other hand,
127 As Charles Black observed, a free speech right might be inferable from the Constitution
even without the First Amendment. See Charles L. Black, Jr., Structure and Relationship in
Constitutional Law 41–50 (Louisiana State, 1969).
128 See, for example, Heidi Kitrosser, Reclaiming Accountability at chap 7 (Chicago, 2015).
129 Parts of this paragraph and the next two are drawn from Section II(C)(1) of Leak
Prosecutions and the First Amendment: New Development and a Closer Look at the Feasibility of
Protecting Leakers, 56 Wm & Mary L Rev 1221, 1244–46 (2015).
130 For elaboration on these points see Kitrosser, Reclaiming Accountability at 147–62 (cited
in note 128).
131 Federalist 76 (Alexander Hamilton) in Lawrence Goldman, ed, The Federalist Papers 373
(2008).
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government employees are crucial safety valves for protecting the
people from abuse and incompetence, given their unique access to
information and to a range of avenues for transmitting the same.
While the Constitution does not dictate the structure of state or
local governments, the logic underlying the federal model—that
internal checks are necessary to head off tyranny or incompetence
by superiors—also bolsters the insights of free speech theory as it
relates to the states and localities.
IV. Practical and Conceptual Objections to
Accommodating Special Value
While academic opinion runs largely against Garcetti, some
thoughtful opposing views have been articulated and warrant atten-
tion. Garcetti’s defenses fall into two rough categories. One set of ar-
guments suggests that Garcetti does not pose much of a threat to free
speech. The other stresses that public employers need ample discre-
tion to manage employees and their work product.
a. free speech value based objections
Some commentators posit that Garcetti’s impact falls predomi-
nantly on internal workplace speech, and that this speech lacks much
salience under the First Amendment.132 It is only when employees
take their concerns public, they argue, that the speech has signifi-
cant First Amendment value. One scholar writes, for example, that
“the First Amendment . . . is intended to facilitate public oversight
of government, and that purpose is not served by intra-governmental
speech.”133 Another argues: “When a public employee brings here-
tofore concealed misconduct into public view, he enables the process
of political accountability to function. . . . Public employees whose
views remain hidden from public view, in contrast, contribute little
to public discussion and debate.”134
132 See Roosevelt, 14 U Pa J Const L at 649 (cited in note 17) (“Garcetti does not reach
speech to the public, unless producing such speech is the employee’s job (in which case the
speech is actually the government’s speech))”; Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First
Amendment Law of Managerial Prerogative, 77 Fordham L Rev 33, 57 (2008) (“For public
employees who take their concerns to the public, Garcetti should pose no bar to First
Amendment protection.”).
133 Roosevelt, 14 U Pa J Const L at 653–54 (cited in note 17).
134 Id at 59.
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This position is belied by the tremendous importance of private
discussions to free speech values, including checking values. In the
context of public employment, effective checking may occur, for
instance, where improprieties are reported up the chain of command,
even if those reports never reach the public. Such checking also can
help shape the information that does make its way to the public. It
may, for example, stymie practices that punish honest or effective
internal reporting that itself enters the public discourse.135
Nor does it resolve First Amendment concerns to suggest that
employees can simply bring their information or complaints directly
to the public or otherwise air them in a manner that falls outside of
their job responsibilities. Public employees’ special value as speakers
stems partly from their capacity to choose from a number of forums,
including those through which they perform their jobs or other
avenues to which the public lacks access. This flexibility enables em-
ployees to make judgments about more or less effective or safe forums
from the outset, and to adapt when government plays shell games
with accountability, as when it purports to provide an avenue for re-
dress that it fails to deliver or that becomes a retaliation trap.136 Such
flexibility also empowers employees to reconcile their checking roles
with respect for bureaucratic protocol without forfeiting constitu-
tional protection. It enables them, for instance, to attempt to report
through internal channels rather than turning to the press as a matter
of first resort.
The Supreme Court has made clear that speech communicated
privately by government employees in the workplace warrants pro-
tection. In Rankin v McPherson, for example, the Court deemed un-
constitutional the firing of McPherson, who worked as a clerical
employee in a constable’s office.137McPhersonwas fired for saying, in
a private office conversation with a work colleague after the two had
heard a radio bulletin about the attempt to assassinate President
135 See Estlund, 2006 Supreme Court Review at 125 (cited in note 9) (citing democratic
benefits of internal employee speech).
136 For one striking example of an apparent retaliation trap, see JaneMayer, The Secret Sharer,
New Yorker (May 23, 2011) (describing simultaneous raid on homes of three persons—two
formerNSA employees and one former congressional staffer—who had filed what they believed
to be a confidential complaint with the Pentagon’s Inspector General).
137 Rankin v McPherson, 483 US 378, 383 (1987).
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Reagan, that Rankin disapproves of Reagan’s policies and that “‘if
they go for him again . . . [she] hope[s] they get him.’”138 The Court
deemed Rankin’s statement to be about a matter of public concern
because it related to President Reagan’s policies and the attempt
on his life.139 In a footnote, the Court rejected the suggestion, made
by the United States as amicus, that “[t]he private nature of the
statement . . . vitiate[s its status] as addressing a matter of public con-
cern.”140 In rejecting this contention, the Court cited Givhan v
Western Line Consolidated School District.141 In Givhan, the Court had
vacated a lower court’s holding that a teacher was not constitution-
ally protected from termination for expressing concerns to her prin-
cipal, in private meetings, about perceived race discrimination in their
school district.142 The Court in Givhan emphasized that the Consti-
tution protects a speaker when she “arranges to communicate pri-
vately with [her] employer rather than to spread [her] views before
the public.”143
b. objections based on managerial discretion
Garcetti’s defenders also emphasize government’s need to manage
its employees.144 Garcetti itself “gestures at” two facets of this view.145
The first—the “government speech” rationale—is the position that
“speech produced pursuant to official duties [is] in some sense gov-
ernment speech.”146When employees speak as the government, their
138 Id at 380–82.
139 Id at 386–87.
140 Id at 386 n 11. The majority also found, in applying Connick-Pickering, that the speech’s
private setting cut strongly against finding it disruptive. Id at 388–89 & 388 n 13. The
majority “agree[d] with Justice Powell,” who concurred, “that a purely private statement on a
matter of public concern will rarely, if ever, justify discharge of a public employee.” Id at 388
n 13. See also Estlund, 2006 Supreme Court Review at 123 (cited in note 9) (citing this aspect
of Rankin).
141 Rankin, 483 US at 386 n 11 (citing Givhan v Western Line Consolidated School District,
439 US 410, 414–16 (1979)).
142 Givhan, 439 US at 412–13.
143 Id at 415–16. See also Estlund, 2006 Supreme Court Review at 121–22 (cited in note 9)
(discussing this aspect of Givhan).
144 See Roosevelt, 14 U Pa J Const L at 652 (cited in note 17); Rosenthal, 77 Fordham L
Rev at 38, 46–49 (cited in note 132).
145 Roosevelt, 14 U Pa J Const L at 635 (cited in note 17).
146 Id.
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employers must have free rein to dictate or correct what they say.147
The second managerial discretion argument—the “evaluation ra-
tionale”—is that spoken or written work product “should be con-
ceptualized as job performance rather than speech,”148 and that courts
are in no position—either constitutionally or as a practical matter—
to second-guess supervisors’ job performance evaluations.149
1. The government speech rationale. The “government speech” ra-
tionale plainly fails to justify Garcetti’s categorical rule. The problem
is not that this consideration is invalid in all cases, but that it is in-
applicable to many public jobs. As discussed earlier, some types of
public employment—let us call them “scripted jobs”—entail con-
veying messages crafted by the government.150 The very nature of
a scripted job demands full governmental control of the messages
that the employee is hired to deliver. Helen Norton offers several
examples of scripted jobs, including those generated “when a school
board hires a press secretary or lobbyist to promote its anti-voucher
position, a health department hires an employee to implement an
antismoking promotional effort . . . or a mayor commissions a mu-
ralist specifically to create patriotic art for the Fourth of July.”151
But as noted earlier,152 and as Norton and others point out, many
government positions, including the assistant district attorney job
at issue in Garcetti, are not scripted jobs (let us call these “unscripted
jobs”). Unscripted jobs call for employees to exercise a nontrivial
degree of independent judgment.153 Such judgment can manifest it-
self in spoken orwritten work product, whether in the form of reports
to supervisors, scientific reports for public or internal distribution,
or court briefings.
It is true that even unscripted employee speech is government
speech in the narrow sense that the government has paid for it.
147 It is on this basis that Kermit Roosevelt dismisses concerns about Garcetti’s impact on
public speech. Though acknowledging that “[s]ome employees might have the job of com-
municating to the public,” he concludes that “such an employee is probably best conceived of
as speaking for the government, in which case the government would be allowed to dictate
the content of the speech.” See id at 647 & 647 n 62.
148 Id.
149 See Part IV(B)(2), (3).
150 See text accompanying notes 111–12.
151 Norton, 59 Duke L J at 30–31 (cited in note 110).
152 See text accompanying notes 112–25.
153 See notes 110–25 and accompanying text.
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But by definition, the government has paid unscripted speakers to
produce undistorted speech.154 In these circumstances, Garcetti’s
categorical rule cannot be justified by invoking the particularized
case of the scripted public employee.
2. The evaluation rationale: the accountability argument. The evalu-
ation rationale has both practical and constitutional dimensions. As
a constitutional matter, Lawrence Rosenthal argues that “if public
policymakers could not remove subordinates whom they regard as
unwilling or unable to execute their duties as those policymakers
wish—including duties that involve speech—then they cannot be
fairly held politically accountable for the performance of their of-
fices. . . . Preserving the process of political control and account-
ability over public offices is surely at the core of our Constitution.”155
The argument from political accountability rests on a premise that
is partly sound. Political actors undoubtedly must retain meaningful
control over unelected bureaucrats and their work product in order
to tie administration to political accountability. But meaningful con-
trol does not necessarily equal full and unfettered control. I have
discussed this point at length in a different context, explaining that
unitary executive theorists err in deeming unfettered presidential
control over all federal executive actors necessary to preserve ac-
countability. As I argue in that setting, the level of political control
necessary to maintain accountability is a functional, fact-sensitive
question. Its answer varies with the nature of both the employment
and the restriction at issue.156
More importantly, as I have also emphasized in discussing unitary
executive theory, unfettered supervisory control can defeat rather
than enhance accountability. This is especially true where written
or spoken work product is at issue. At the federal level, for example,
“[u]nfettered presidential control can be used . . . to keep truthful in-
formation from emerging from the executive branch through White
House vetting of congressional testimony, pressure to alter scien-
tific findings for political reasons, or secretive influence over agency
154 See Part III(A)(2) for discussion of the concept of distortion.
155 Rosenthal, 77 Fordham L Rev at 48 (cited in note 132). Another scholar ties employee
speech protections themselves to political accountability, explaining that “[i]f the democratic
community needs or desires free and open ‘whistleblower’ speech, it can enact the appro-
priate laws.” Garry, 81 St John’s L Rev at 815 (cited in note 17).
156 See Kitrosser, Reclaiming Accountability at 165–66 (cited in note 128).
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policy decisions.”157 HelenNorton makes a similar point in critiquing
Garcetti, explaining that “the government’s accountability for its
performance may well be undercut by the carte blancheGarcetti gives
government to discipline workers who truthfully report irregularities
and improprieties pursuant to their official duties.”158
3. The evaluation rationale: arguments concerning judicial overreach
and relative competence. The most challenging defenses of Garcetti
are based on notions of comparative institutional advantage. Spe-
cifically, they are grounded in arguments that public employers are
better situated than judges to evaluate employee work product. The
point is partly about competence. As Kermit Roosevelt puts it,
“the employer is much better than a judge at deciding whether par-
ticular speech is good job performance or not.”159 Nor would it help
for courts to apply the Connick-Pickering test and weigh, case by case,
the public employer’s efficiency interests against employees’ interests
in “commenting upon matters of public concern.”160 As Roosevelt
explains, Connick-Pickering’s application “would prevent employers
from firing or reassigning employees whose memos address issues
of public concern and are nondisruptive, but are riddled with errors
of legal analysis.”161 Roosevelt also suggests that the judiciary is not
the constitutionally appropriate institution to judge work product
quality. Such content-based judicial judgments, he explains, would
themselves raise First Amendment concerns.162
Concerns over institutional roles and competence are serious, but
they are overstated in important respects. For one thing, as lower
court applications of Garcetti reflect, the lines separating work prod-
uct speech from other public employee speech often are quite fuzzy.
The Garcetti rule itself thus demands no easy judicial feat. More im-
portantly, this means that there is no bright line separating what
courts have done for years—apply the Connick-Pickering test to “non-
work product” speech—from the task of applyingConnick-Pickering to
work product speech.
157 Id at 144.
158 Norton, 59 Duke L J at 33 (cited in note 110).
159 Roosevelt, 14 U Pa J Const L at 653 (cited in note 17).
160 See text accompanying note 8.
161 Roosevelt, 14 U Pa J Const L at 652 (cited in note 17).
162 Id.
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Even when we can comfortably identify work product speech,
institutionally based objections to judicial review rest on a faulty
premise. They assume that judicial review must entail substantive
assessment of work product quality, duplicating the review con-
ducted by work supervisors. But, as I will show in subpart C, this
need not be the case.
c. accommodating supervisors’ evaluative needs without
sacrificing special value
Judicial review in the work product context can and should be
designed not to second-guess supervisor assessments of work prod-
uct quality, but to smoke out retaliation against work product speech
for reasons other than quality. The need for managerial discretion is at
its apex in the realm of work product quality review. And employers’
nonpretextual, quality-based judgments do not pose a strong threat
to special value. On the other hand, special value is deeply threatened
by retaliation in response to inconvenient facts or analysis in work
product speech. Although such retaliation is not the only proper
target of judicial review, it ought to be its main target.
Under the approach suggested here, then, courts would effec-
tively leave nonpretextual decisions based on work product quality
untouched. For example, a government lawyer’s supervisor would
have free rein to discipline her for turning in amemorandum “riddled
with errors of legal analysis.”163 Similarly, a government scientist’s
superior would be free to discipline her for sloppy research methods
or poorly written reports. On the other hand, retaliating against a
government lawyer for her internal legal advice, not because the ad-
vice is unsound but because it provides a politically inconvenient
answer, is not a work quality-based judgment.Norwould it constitute
a work quality-based decision were a government scientist’s super-
visors to discipline her for reaching scientific conclusions in tension
with an administration’s policy agenda. On the other hand, a scripted
employee’s failure to stick to her script could legitimately be deemed
poor work quality warranting discipline.
At this point, some of my fellowGarcetti critics might questionwhy
one would draw any threshold distinction between work product
speech and non-work product speech in the first place. They could
163 See text accompanying note 161 (citing Roosevelt’s use of this example).
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point to the practical difficulties in making the distinction. They
might add that, even if we could confidently identify work product
speech, the best way to accommodate free speech and managerial
needs is to evaluate all challenged discipline under the fact-sensitive
Connick-Pickering test.
In response to these concerns, it is important first to acknowl-
edge that it is no easy task to distinguish work product speech from
other public employee speech made in the workplace. Lower court
decisions betray both this difficulty and the risk that poor line-
drawing will suppress speech. That said, some work product speech
is relatively easy to identify as such. Examples include legal briefs
or memoranda written by government lawyers in the course of liti-
gating their assigned cases, or scientific reports written at the request
of agency scientists’ superiors.
Furthermore, the fact that discipline for work product speech is
not immune from judicial review under my approach should conduce
to greater definitional precision. Such discipline would be spared
further review only after a judicial determination that it was based on
work product quality. This may help to narrow judicial understand-
ings of work product speech to speech of a type that could be re-
viewed for its professional quality in the first place. In Part VI, I
elaborate further on tools that courts can use to focus their con-
ceptions of work product speech. The fact that work product speech
based discipline would not be immune from judicial review also
lowers the stakes of questionable judicial judgments in identifying
such speech.
In addition, my approach has advantages over one that draws no
distinction between work product speech and other employee speech.
It accommodates the most compelling managerial prerogative needs
without sacrificing free speech value. On the other hand, apply-
ing Connick-Pickering to evaluative determinations poses some risk
to free speech value. The test, already subject to very deferential
applications, may become yet more diluted through its application to
such decisions.
Of course, my approach could be criticized from another per-
spective—that of Garcetti’s supporters. Such critics might argue that
it is infeasible for courts to assess whether managerial judgments are
based on work product quality without themselves evaluating such
quality. But courts have considerable experience conducting inqui-
ries designed to smoke out illegitimate decision-making bases and to
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distinguish them from permissible rationales. While hardly perfect,
such inquiries are intrinsically different from those that second-guess
a decision maker’s substantive judgments.
V. An Alternative to Garcetti
a. determining whether discipline is based
on work product quality
1. What is a work product quality based assessment? Public employers
should be free to discipline employees for poor work product quality.
The difficulty is in providing that freedom without granting carte
blanche to employers to retaliate against work product speech for
other reasons. The most serious concern, in light of special value, is
that employers will attempt to distort work product speech. In other
words, as Cynthia Estlund puts it, they will punish employees for
“doing the job [they were] hired to do—indeed, perhaps for doing the
job too well.”164 This could entail “honestly criticizing the perfor-
mance of [their] superiors or other public officials.”165 It could also
entail honestly and competently issuing reports that reflect the pro-
fessional norms of the position—whether legal, scientific, or other-
wise—for which one was hired.
Estlund’s work helps us to see how one might frame the distinc-
tion between distorting speech versus punishing speakers for poor
quality speech. She explains that “[e]mployees whose jobs require
the exercise and expression of judgment or the disclosure of infor-
mation on matters of public concern should enjoy a reasonable ex-
pectation that they will not be penalized for expressing that judgment
and disclosing that information in a responsible manner.”166 She also
stresses that employers can defend themselves on the basis that the
employee’s “speech, though onmatters of public concern and uttered
in the course of her job constituted poor job performance.”167
Estlund frames her approach as somewhat of a hybrid due process
and First Amendment claim. Rather than having courts conduct
the proposed inquiry, she would have courts require impartial ad-
164 Cynthia Estlund, Free Speech Rights That Work at Work: From the First Amendment to Due
Process, 54 UCLA L Rev 1463, 1475 (2007).
165 Id.
166 Id at 1477.
167 Id at 1479.
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ministrative hearings. The hearing right would stem from a “con-
vergence of legitimate employee expectations and the constitutional
value of speech on matters of public concern.”168 Estlund’s proposal
is an important one, and it is far preferable to a world in which public
employees have no constitutional right to challenge work product
speech based discipline. That said, administrative hearings suffer
from potential shortcomings relative to judicial forums, as Estlund
acknowledges.169 Additionally, it is important to establish that a
middle ground—one between adjudicators abstaining entirely from
reviewing work product speech based discipline and their probing
the substantive merits of work product quality—can be found in the
judicial realm itself. And it is equally important to understand that
the free speech value of public employee work product is strong
enough to fuel a First Amendment claim in its own right, ideally
toward the end of overturning Garcetti or, at a minimum, toward nar-
rowing Garcetti’s reach. For that matter, even a hybrid due-process/
First Amendment analysis is stronger if underscored partly by free
speech reasoning that could stand on its own.
Thus, while the inquiry that Estlund suggests can be justified partly
through employees’ reasonable expectations that they will not be
punished for doing their jobs “too well,” the same inquiry is war-
ranted on First Amendment grounds alone in light of the special value
of public employee speech and antidistortion concerns.
2. How will courts determine whether discipline was based on quality?
The prospect of judges asking if employment decisions were quality
based inevitably conjures concerns about judicial intrusion and com-
petence. But the judiciary has a number of tools at its disposal to make
this determination without either overreaching or rubber-stamping
employer decisions.
The easiest case, of course, is when the fact of a non-quality-based
decision can be discerned from the employer’s own explanation. For
instance, an employer might explicitly discipline a scientist hired to
conduct research because he reached a conclusion incompatible with
168 Id at 1480.
169 Id at 1490–96. The point is not that administrative proceedings are clearly inferior. As
Estlund details, each option entails trade-offs. The point is that, insofar as there are rea-
sonable arguments in favor of judicial rather than administrative tribunals, it is important to
understand the former’s feasibility. Such understanding also sheds light on the capacity of
courts to review any administrative proceedings.
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an administration’s policy goals. Or a public employer might disci-
pline an employee charged with investigating internal corruption
because she “ruffled feathers” by finding corruption by higher-ups.
Such rationales would amount to admissions that employers punished
employees for doing the very jobs for which they were hired. As such,
they would not constitute quality-based determinations.
In some instances, a public employer might justify disciplining an
employee for a legitimate reason, but the employee might contest
the veracity of the explanation. In such situations, courts can consider
whether the employer’s claim is pretextual.
While establishing actual purpose is notoriously tricky, it is a task
that courts take on inmultiple contexts, including constitutional cases
and employment cases. Courts regularly ask, for example, whether
laws are based on the content of speech on their face or in their
underlying purposes.170 Indeed, then-professor Elena Kagan argued
in 1996 that themost important aspects of First Amendment doctrine
are “best understood and most readily explained as . . . [indirect]
motive hunting” devices.171 She suggested, for example, that the only
sensible justification for the presumption against facially content-
based laws is the view that “content-based regulation [usually] emerges
from illicit motives.”172 By the same token, she deemed courts’ appli-
cation of strict scrutiny to such laws to be “best understood as an
evidentiary device that allows the government to disprove the impli-
cation of improper motive arising from the content-based terms of a
law.”173
In the equal protection context, courts regularly make explicit in-
quiries into whether government intentionally discriminated on the
basis of race or some other suspect or quasi-suspect category. Indeed,
the Supreme Court has developed a robust body of constitutional
doctrine to address challenges to the effect that laws or other acts that
are neutral on their face are discriminatory in purpose and effect.174
And in statutory cases, courts routinely examine whether neutral
170 See, for example, Bartnicki v Vopper, 532 US 514, 526 (2001) (citing Ward v Rock Against
Racism, 491 US 781, 791 (1989)).
171 Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U Chi L Rev 413, 414 (1996).
172 Id at 451.
173 Id at 453.
174 See, for example, Rogers v Lodge, 458 US 613, 618 (1982).
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explanations for employee discipline are pretexts for discrimina-
tion.175 Courts thus are well versed in evaluating neutral explanations
by public and private entities, including employers, to determine
whether they are pretexts for forbidden purposes.
Among the factors to which an employer might point to rebut an
impermissible motive claim is that the employer’s quality assessment
was made using standard evaluative procedures, including review by
supervisors with expertise in the relevant field. The employer might
also benefit from a workplace history of effective whistle-blower
protections to which the employee bringing suit had access. The very
fact of such procedures ought not to be decisive. But their availability
and efficacy can be material to a court’s analysis.
This feature of the proposed inquiry has the obvious benefit of
incentivizing employers to create effective workplace speech pro-
tections. Among the more criticized aspects of the Garcetti decision
is its reference to statutory and regulatory whistle-blower protec-
tions. The Court suggested that any hole that its decision left in
workplace speech protections was covered in large part by statutory
and regulatory measures.176 As critics—including the dissenters in
Garcetti—pointed out, this aspect of the majority opinion painted an
unrealistically rosy picture of the breadth and effectiveness of non-
constitutional whistle-blower protections.177 The approach proposed
here, in contrast, makes no factual assumptions about the existence or
effectiveness of workplace speech protections. It simply recognizes
that such protections, where they do exist, may shed light on the sin-
cerity of employers’ claims.
b. the bigger doctrinal picture
The treatment of public employee speech that does not consti-
tute work product is beyond the scope of this article. The only impact
that the approach set out in this article would have in this realm is
to increase the amount of speech labeled non-work product. Such
an increase would follow both from my admonition to err on the
side of deeming speech non-work product in questionable cases, and
from the constraint that work product speech must be conducive to
175 See, for example, Reeves v Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 US 133, 141–43 (2000).
176 Garcetti, 547 US at 425–26.
177 See id at 439–41 (Souter, J, dissenting).
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quality-based assessments. Once speech is deemed non-work prod-
uct, though, I assume here that the Connick-Pickering test would con-
tinue to apply.
My proposed approach to work product speech itself intersects
with Connick-Pickering in two respects. First, when a court finds that
discipline for work product speech did not stem from a judgment of
work product quality, judicial reviewwould simply proceed under the
Connick-Pickering test. Second, in performing the Connick-Pickering
test, courts should adopt a strong presumption against finding a suf-
ficient efficiency interest when the claimed interest is based on the
communicative effects of an employee’s conveying information or
opinion in conformity with her job requirements. This presumption
is called for in light of the strong free speech value of such con-
veyances, and the close relationship between punishing such speech
and distortion. The presumption also poses little risk to the legitimate
exercise of managerial discretion. Indeed, courts applying Connick-
Pickering necessarily will have concluded that discipline was not based
on work product quality.
VI. If All Else Fails: Coping with Garcetti
My proposed approach marks less of a break from the status
quo than would an approach that draws no distinction between work
product speech and other public employee speech. My approach’s
chance of adoption by the Supreme Court, while still slim, thus may
be greater than that of a more radical alternative to Garcetti.
It seems most realistic, however, to expect Garcetti to stay with us
for some time. The most constructive suggestions for mitigating its
harms thus are those designed to limit its reach. The same arguments
that support Garcetti’s overruling support the lesser measure of nar-
rowing its scope. Lane v Franks also provides a useful starting point
for limiting Garcetti. And the lower court cases explored in Part II
provide instructive examples—both positive and negative—of ap-
proaches to defining work product speech.
My primary suggestion is that courts should apply Garcetti only
to relatively clear cases of work product speech.178 While defining
178 Kermit Roosevelt, though mostly supportive of Garcetti, similarly concludes that it
should extend only to “work product.” See Roosevelt, 14 U Pa J Const L at 645–49 (cited in
note 17).
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such speech is a fact-sensitive exercise, courts could institutionalize
the clarity requirement. They might, for instance, create a presump-
tion against finding something to be work product speech whenever
the question is a close one. Courts ought also to draw on Lane’s ref-
erences to “ordinary job responsibilities,” and conclude, as some
lower courts have speculated, that speech activity must indeed be part
of one’s typical daily job responsibilities to qualify as work product
speech. It is true that Lane did not turn solely on the fact that Lane’s
testimony was not among his ordinary job responsibilities. The Court
in Lane referenced several material facts, concluding that “[t]ruthful
testimony under oath by a public employee outside the scope of his
ordinary job duties is speech as a citizen for First Amendment pur-
poses.”179 Nonetheless, much of Lane’s reasoning—including its em-
phases on the dangers of employer efforts to suppress information
damaging to itself, the special value of public employee speech con-
tent, and the risks of reading Garcetti so broadly as to undermine that
value—conduces to such a reading.
Courts also might carve out an exception to Garcetti, a presump-
tion against its application, or at least a factor weighing against its
application whenever truthful reporting of corruption or serious gov-
ernmental misconduct is at issue. In so doing, courts would be taking
a page from the Fourth Circuit, which held that public employee
“‘speech about serious governmental misconduct . . . is protected.’”180
There are two independent reasons for courts to adopt this ap-
proach. First, such speech plainly has high checking value. Second,
courts should look skeptically upon governmental pleas to control
speech about its own misconduct.
Courts ought also to reject some factors as irrelevant to defining
work product speech. Most importantly, courts should deem the fact
that information was learned on the job irrelevant to this inquiry. As
we have seen, and as the Lane Court recognized, public employees’
privileged access to information is a core part of their special First
Amendment value. Furthermore, becausemost speech anywhere near
the category of work product speech will include information learned
on or through the speaker’s job, it is hard to see how that factor will
help courts to distinguish work product speech from other speech.
179 Lane, 134 S Ct at 2378.
180 See text accompanying note 79.
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Additionally, the Court in Lane made clear that the Garcetti lan-
guage on which lower courts have relied in considering information’s
origin—namely, Garcetti’s reference to speech that “‘owes its exis-
tence to [the] employee’s professional responsibilities’”181—does not
mean what those lower courts have taken it tomean. Given the special
value at stake, the factor’s low probative worth, and the problematic
reading of Garcetti’s language from which the factor is typically drawn,
courts should stop treating the fact that information was learned
through one’s job as relevant to the Garcetti inquiry.
VII. Conclusion
While it is no easy task to situate the First Amendment within
the context of public employee speech, it is not impossible to do so
wisely. The Court in Garcetti erred insofar as it suggested that any
level of judicial review over managerial discipline for employee work
product speech would intolerably compromise managerial control.
What is called for is employer autonomy for particular types of deci-
sions about work product—specifically, those based on work prod-
uct quality—with judicial review to determine if particular employer
decisions fall into that category. This approach hones in on employ-
ers’ most pressing managerial needs, but also protects those aspects
of employee discretion and independence that are essential to pre-
serving the special constitutional value of public employee speech.
181 Lane, 134 S Ct at 2376. See also Part II(A)(1) (discussing this aspect ofGarcetti and lower
court interpretations of the same).
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